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NomeNclature
ASMD  Anti-ship missile defence
ASCM   Anti-ship cruise missile
Dr   Target denial range
hradar  Radar height
hASCM  ASCM flight altitude
α   Number of interceptor launchers
L   Number of layers in layered defence
m   Number of engagements
n   Number of interceptors fired
µ   Minimum number of interceptors required to  
  fire
pd   Detection probability of ASMD
pk|d   Kill probability of ASMD after detection.
pk|d(m)  Cumulative kill probability of m engagements  
  after detection.
δ
ι   
Detection probability of the ith sensor
pk   Interceptor’s single shot kill probability (SSKP) 
pkj   SSKP at j
th engagement
p’kl   Kill probability of the target at l
th layer in layered 
  defence
p   Overall kill probability of the target
ps   Survival probability = 1-p
pa   Acceptable leakage probability
rL1   Range to launch the first interceptor
rd   Target detection range
rmin   Min. interceptor launch range 
xre   Max. effective interception range
nre   Min. effective interception range
rj   Interceptor launch range at the j
th engagement
Rj   Interception range at the j
th engagement
Rmax  Max. radar detection range
Rhor   Radar horizon range
σ   Radar cross section
S   Number of sensors
tL   Inter-firing time 
tk   Kill assessment time
TD   Engagement duration
Tj   Time to j
th interception
τ   Initial reaction time
tf   Time of flight of the interceptor
VASCM  ASCM  velocity 
Vint   Interceptor velocity
w   Salvo size
1. INtroDuctIoN
Since Falkland war, naval war scenarios have undergone 
sea changes with the successful operation of sea skimming 
anti-ship missiles. Today, the principal threat to naval ships 
is anti-ship cruise missiles. These missiles are either flying in 
subsonic speed with very low altitude, almost touching sea 
surface, maneuvering or in supersonic speed giving very less 
reaction time thus posing significant threat to target ships. 
A new variant of ballistic missiles for anti-ship role has 
been under development in China that can engage moving 
ships thousand miles away from the shore. This anti-ship 
ballistic missile (ASBM) with maneuvering re-entry vehicle 
and homing seeker is designed to keep the US Naval ships 
at bay in the event of any conflict1. The US is also gearing 
up its existing sea based ballistic missile defence system to 
counter ASBM threats2,3. The sequence of events i.e. detection, 
classification, identification and engagement that the anti-ship 
missile defence (ASMD) system follows against both ASCM 
and ASBM are similar although technologies involved are 
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different; therefore, approaches for effectiveness analysis for 
both the cases are also similar. This paper concentrates on the 
ship defence against an anti-ship cruise missile only.
The effectiveness of a weapon system is a quantitative 
measure of the level up to which the system meets its objective. 
The evaluation of effectiveness is usually complex since it 
depends on number of factors affecting the performance of the 
system4.
Analysis of ASMD effectiveness helps the analyst to 
understand impact of different factors like speed, altitude and 
radar cross section of the threat missile, speed and number of 
interceptors, detection range, environment etc. to overall system 
effectiveness and hence helps to take necessary measures for 
improvements of naval tactics or defence systems. There are many 
complex physical and combatant interactions in a ship defence 
and ASCM attack scenario. Modeling & simulation is useful in 
analysing over a wide range of complex engagement conditions. 
However, analytical approach is better for understanding insight 
of the system reasonably in simplified form. 
Bradford5 has discussed a probabilistic assessment of 
single ship defence effectiveness against a stream or wave of 
missile attacks. Eric6, et al. described a simple methodology 
for determining how to allocate resources among layers of a 
multi-layered missile defence in cost effective way. Hideto7 
discussed measure of effectiveness of an air defence system 
against an attacking missile in littoral environment. Dowan and 
Chang-Kyung8 suggested defence strategy logic of single ship 
against multiple ASCMs using closed range anti-air missiles. 
Roy9 studied ship survivability from ASCM attack using kill-
chain analysis.
In the present paper, a probabilistic analysis of anti-
ship missile defence system effectiveness is discussed by 
considering a scenario of a single ship defence with multiple 
interceptors firing against a single non-maneuvering missile 
attack. Survivability of a ship against an anti-ship missile 
threat depends upon the effectiveness of its missile defence 
system that includes both hard-kill and soft-kill defence means. 
However, hard kill lethality is considered as the measure of 
effectiveness in this analysis. The paper discusses effect of 
different firing policies undertaken by the defender to achieve 
maximum ship survivability, expected number of interceptors 
to be fired to achieve desired outcome, effect of multi-sensor 
and layered defence environment. 
2. metHoDoloGY oF eFFectIVeNeSS 
eValuatIoN
Lethality, i.e. the ability to encounter, engage and killing a 
target, may be considered as the measure of effectiveness of the 
ASMD. The sequence of operations in lethality assessment is 
probabilistic in nature. The measure of effectiveness of lethality 
may therefore be expressed in terms of kill probability as
 |d k dp p p=                                                                     (1)
The capability of ASMD to destroy targets depends on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the system10. The factor pd 
of Eqn. (1) is considered as detection probability that refers 
to efficiency of the system and concerns to the front end of 
the ASMD that includes detection, acquisition, command & 
control and communication. It describes how quickly targets 
can be detected, acquired and engaged. Probabilities related 
to all these events here are combined to detection probability. 
The factor pk|d is considered as the kill probability of the missile 
once it is detected and it relates to kill mechanism of the system. 
In this case, probabilities associated with tracking accuracy, 
fuzing and warhead impact are multiplicative in nature and are 
combined to kill probability pk|d.
Depending upon the effectiveness of an interceptor against 
a threat in terms of kill probability, there is a need to determine 
the number of interceptors to be fired at the incoming threat to 
achieve a given level of defence effectiveness. On the other 
hand, if the number of interceptors allocated per threat is taken 
as fixed due to resource consideration, then it is to be known 
what kill probability of the interceptor that should be achieved 
with fixed numbers for the desired level of defence. The 
value of p, which represents level of technological or tactical 
requirements of the ASMD system, needs to be analysed.
To increase the lethality p (in Eqn. (1)),the possible 
options are-to increase either (i) pd or, (ii) pk|d, or (iii) both pd 
and pk|d. The ASMD may fire multiple interceptors to increase 
pk|d by following shoot-shoot (SS) firing policy or shot-look-
shot (S-L-S) firing policy. In SS firing policy, a salvo of 
interceptors are fired towards the threat missile, where as in 
S-L-S firing policy, a single interceptor or a salvo is fired and 
then kill assessment is carried out after each round of fire. 
Second or subsequent rounds are fired if the target is not killed. 
In SS policy over-killing of a target is possible, whereas S-L-S 
firing policy tries to avoid it and thus saves interceptors from 
excess firing11.
2.1 to Increase pk|d with multiple Shots: Shoot-
Shoot Firing Policy
In a shoot-shoot firing policy that fires multiple 
interceptors n against a threat almost continuously without 
assessing outcome of the interceptors fired, the kill probability 
pk|d, becomes
 ( )( )| 1 1 nk d kp p= − −                                                      (2)
It is assumed that the firing of interceptors is statistically 
independent with identical kill probability, pk. The lethality of 
the ASMD thus can be expressed as
 ( )( )1 1 nd kp p p= − −                                                     (3)
ASMD lethality, is therefore, depends on detection 
probability (pd), kill probability of an interceptor (pk) and number 
of interceptors (n) fired. Table 1 indicates ASMD lethality 
values with number of interceptors n fired corresponding to a 
set of values of pd and pk. The results depict that the detection 
probability is a crucial parameter and it constraints the ASMD 
effectiveness as the upper limit.
2.1.1 Determination of the Number of Interceptors 
to be Fired
Total number of interceptors, n that ASMD can fire depends 
upon total available engagement duration (TD), inter firing time 
(tL), i.e the time between two successive interceptor launches 
and number of available launchers (α). Total engagement time 
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depends upon factors like, maximum/minimum effective firing 
range in the operational situation, ASCM velocity (VASCM) and 
the target detection range as follows
1 minL
D
ASCM
r rT
V
−=                                                                 (4)
Here rL1 is the initial interceptor launch range and rmin= max(Dr, 
nre). Dr is considered as the denial range that is the range at 
which the target missile ASCM would not be allowed to cross 
and nre is the minimum effective interception range. 
The number n can be derived as:
1 minint intD L
L L ASCM
T r rn
t t V
     α −α= =      
      
                     (5)
where int(x) represents the integral part of x. It is obvious from 
Eqn. (5) that, n decreases with the increase of VASCM or tL or rmin 
or with the decrease of α or rL1.
(a) Determination of initial interceptor launch range: 
rL1
In case of early detection of the ASCM, the ASMD may 
engage the missile with a sequence of engagements starting 
from range rL1, provided that the target is within the effective 
firing zone [nre, xre]. The initial launch range rL1is determined 
as shown in Appendix A as
( )
1
int
,   
      1 ,   
L d d e
ASCM
e L ASCM d e
r r if r xr
V
xr t V if r xr
V
= ≤
 
= + + τ + > 
 
 (6)
Here, Vint is the interceptor velocity (taken as constant) and τ 
is the initial reaction time of ASMD and xre is the maximum 
effective interception range.
(b) ASCM detection range (rd)
Probability of detection of an attacking ASCM depends 
upon ASMD radar performance and also upon availability of 
the target line of sight. The target detection range rd in a tactical 
situation is the minimum distance between the maximum radar 
detection range, Rmax, and the radar horizon range, Rhor, i.e.
( )maxmin ,d horr R R=                                                       (7)
Rmax depends upon radar characteristics, target characteristics 
and environment factors and can be determined using radar 
equation9. It is found from the radar equation that, Rmax is 
directly proportional to radar cross section as
1
4
maxR SNR
σ ∝   
                                                     (8)
where SNR is the signal to noise ratio. For a small radar cross 
section(σ) the radar detection range Rmax becomes significantly 
short.
The radar horizon range, Rhor can be calculated using the 
following equation9
( )4.124hor radar ASCMR h h= +                                     (9)
where hradar and hASCM are considered as height of the radar and 
flight altitude of the ASCM. If ASCM flies at a low altitude 
then the radar horizon becomes short reducing Rhor that further 
reduces the detection range. Thus, small sized low flying 
missiles are difficult to detect.
2.1.2 Defence Requirement to Meet Performance 
Criterion
It seems reasonable to characterize mission requirements 
by establishing a ‘denial area’ at ‘acceptable risk’ that refers to 
that area of coverage by ASMD within which it has a desirable 
level of defence against the ASCM attack. As the denial area 
is expanded, the ASMD cannot provide effective defence to 
the entire area with the available resources which increases 
the possibility of the ASCM to survive ASMD and thus leak 
Pd→    0.80       0.85        0.90        0.95       0.99       0.80       0.85        0.90        0.95       0.99
Pk↓ n=1 n=2
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
0.4000    0.4250    0.4500    0.4750    0.4950
0.4800    0.5100    0.5400    0.5700    0.5940
0.5600    0.5950    0.6300    0.6650    0.6930
0.6400    0.6800    0.7200    0.7600    0.7920
0.7200    0.7650    0.8100    0.8550    0.8910
    0.6000    0.6375    0.6750    0.7125    0.7425
    0.6720    0.7140    0.7560    0.7980    0.8316
    0.7280    0.7735    0.8190    0.8645    0.9009
    0.7680    0.8160    0.8640    0.9120    0.9504
    0.7920    0.8415    0.8910    0.9405    0.9801
n=3 n=4
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
0.7000    0.7438    0.7875    0.8312    0.8662
0.7488    0.7956    0.8424    0.8892    0.9266
0.7784    0.8270    0.8757    0.9243    0.9633
0.7936    0.8432    0.8928    0.9424    0.9821
0.7992    0.8491    0.8991    0.9490    0.9890
    0.7500    0.7969    0.8438    0.8906    0.9281
    0.7795    0.8282    0.8770    0.9257    0.9647
    0.7935    0.8431    0.8927    0.9423    0.9820
    0.7987    0.8486    0.8986    0.9485    0.9884
    0.7999    0.8499    0.8999    0.9499    0.9899
n=5 n=6
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
0.7750    0.8234    0.8719    0.9203    0.9591
0.7918    0.8413    0.8908    0.9403    0.9799
0.7981    0.8479    0.8978    0.9477    0.9876
0.7997    0.8497    0.8997    0.9497    0.9897
0.8000    0.8500    0.9000    0.9500    0.9900
    0.7875    0.8367    0.8859    0.9352    0.9745
    0.7967    0.8465    0.8963    0.9461    0.9859
    0.7994    0.8494    0.8993    0.9493    0.9893
    0.7999    0.8499    0.8999    0.9499    0.9899
    0.8000    0.8500    0.9000    0.9500    0.9900
table 1. aSmD lethality values with varying n, pd and pk
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or penetrate the defensive area and becomes a threat to ship’s 
survivability. The acceptable level of leakage is dependent on 
the mission objective.
Survival probability, ps of the target missile can be derived 
from Eqn. (3), as
( )( )1 1 1 1 ns d kp p p p= − = − − −                                 (10)
If pa is considered as the probability associated with 
acceptable risk of leakage then we should have as pp ≤ . 
Keeping in mind the possible attack density of missiles, duration 
and time of attack, ASMD system has to fire the interceptors 
judiciously against each of the threats. Therefore, it requires 
to fire optimum number of interceptors against a single threat 
for a desired level of lethality. If µ  is the minimum number of 
interceptors to be fired by the ASMD against the threat ASCM 
under an acceptable risk of leakage, then from Eqn. (10) we 
get,
( )( )1 1 1a d kp p p µ− = − −                                             (11)
Therefore, one can derive the minimum number of 
interceptors µ to be fired under a desired level of risk, pa as:
log(1 (1 ) / )
log(1 )
a d
k
p p
p
− −µ =
−
                                             (12) 
Equation (12) can be used to determine minimum 
interceptor requirements against an ASCM threat with given 
values of pa, pd and pk. Figure 1 below indicates expected 
number of minimum interceptors to be fired by the ASMD 
against an ASCM to achieve lethality more than 0.80 (i.e. less 
than 0.20 leakage probability). To achieve minimum µ, it is 
required to increase pk or pd or both pk and pd. It is further to 
be noted that the minimum detection probability to achieve the 
lethality must be greater than 0.80.
carried out after each engagement. Engagements continue till 
the target is killed. S-L-S firing policy restricts over-killing of 
the target and thus controls high interceptor firing cost.
If there are m engagements and r1, r2, …,rm are the 
ranges of successive engagements, then  rL1≥ r1, r2, …, rm≥nre, 
whererL1 is defined in Eqn. (6). Also, if pkj is considered as 
the kill probability at the jth engagement (j=1,2,...,m), then 
the cumulative kill probability of the ASMD in case of S-L-S 
firing policy is given as
( )
( )
| 1 1 2 1 2 3
1 2 1
1 2
1
( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ........
                             (1 )(1 ).......(1 )
           1 (1 )(1 ).......(1 )
           1 1
k d k k k k k k
k k kmk m
k k km
m
kj
j
p m p p p p p p
p p p p
p p p
p
−
=
= + − + − − +
+ − − −
= − − − −
= − −∏
                                                                                (13)
Here, we consider, 0<pkj<1, if nre≤ rj  ≤ xreelse pkj = 0; 
for j=1,2..,m. We can express the overall kill probability under 
S-L-S policy with m sequence of engagements as
( ) ( )|
1
1 1
m
d k d d kj
j
p p p m p p
=
 
= = − −   
∏
                       
(14)
If the number of engagements is not adequate to kill the 
target, then a salvo of interceptors needs to be fired to increase 
the lethality to the desired level at each engagement. This 
would change S-L-S firing policy to salvo-look-salvo firing 
policy. The Eqn. (14) becomes
( )
1
1 1 j
m
w
d kj
j
p p p
=
 
= − −   
∏                                          (15)
where wj is the size of the salvo at the j
th engagement. 
Assuming, pk as the constant kill probability for all the 
engagements i.e. pk = pkj, for j = 1,2,..m 
Then the lethality 
under salvo-look-salvo firing policy becomes
( ) 11 1
m
j
j
w
d kp p p =
 
 = − −  
∑                                 (16)
2.2.1 To Compute Number of Possible Sequence of 
Engagements (m)
To compute the number of possible engagements, m, we 
proceed to calculate successive interception time points Tj and 
interception ranges, Rj (j=1,2,..,m) as follows:
Time to first interception after detection, T1 is expressed
6 
as ( )1
1
int
L L ASCM
ASCM
r t V
T
V V
− τ +
=
+
                                                (17)
and the interception range is calculated as
1 int 1R V T=                                                                   (18)
The second engagement may take place after time 
(T1+tL+tk), if the first one is a miss. Here tk is considered as the 
kill assessment time of the target.
For the second engagement, the interception time and 
interception range are calculated as
( )1
2
int
L k ASCM
ASCM
R t t V
T
V V
− +
=
+
                                              (19)
Figure 1. expected number of  minimum interceptors 
required.
2.2 to Increase pk|d with multiple Shots: Shoot-
look-Shoot (S-l-S) Firing Policy
In S-L-S firing policy, a sequence of engagements are 
made against the target and kill assessment of the target is 
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Using Eqn. (17) and Eqn. (18), we get
( ) ( )1 int
2
int int int
L L ASCM L k ASCM
ASCM ASCM ASCM
r t V t t VV
T
V V V V V V
   − τ + + 
= −       + + +    
 
                                                                   (20)
and  
2 int 2R V T=                                                                 (21)
The second engagement is feasible, if R2>rmin. 
For determining third and subsequent sequence of 
engagements, the values of T and R can be computed iteratively. 
Finally, time to intercept the target at the mth engagement, Tm, 
can be determined as
( ) ( )1 11 int int
m
int int int int0
m im
L L ASCM L k ASCM
ASCM ASCM ASCM ASCMi
r t V t t VV V
T
V V V V V V V V
− −
=
   − τ + +   
= −         + + + +      
∑
  
                                                                                             (22)
The mth engagement is feasible, if
m
min
int
 
m
rMax T
V
≥                                                             (23)
Using Eqn. (12) above, one can determine analytically the 
number of interceptors to be fired with known values of pa, 
pd, and pk. However, in case of S-L-S firing policy, expected 
number of interceptors to be fired is obtained through iterative 
process only.
2.2.2 To Determine Expected Number of Effective 
Interceptors
The expected number of interceptors, required to fire in 
the case of salvo-look-salvo firing policy with m engagement 
sequences can be determined as
( )
1
11
2
1
i
j
j
m
w
i k
i
n w w p
−
=
=
= + − ∑∑                              (24)
where wi (i=1,2,..m) is the salvo size of the i
th engagement. For 
a salvo of fixed size w, for all the engagements, Eqn. (24) can 
be expressed as11
( )( )1
2
1 1
m
i w
k
i
n w p −
=
 
= + − 
 
∑                                    (25)
Table 2 shows expected number of interceptors required 
in salvo-look-salvo firing with varying salvo sizes and kill 
probabilities (pk = 0.5, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9). In a salvo firing (of size 
2 shots) of a single sequence, both the rounds are fired almost 
simultaneously. In the S-L-S firing policy (one round each in 
two sequences), the second round is fired if the first round is 
a miss and therefore with kill probability of 0.5, the expected 
number of interceptors required is 1.50. The potential savings 
in interceptors is therefore observed as 0.5 whereas with kill 
probability of 0.7, the expected saving becomes 0.7 interceptors. 
The expected number of interceptors depends upon number of 
engagements, kill probability and firing policy.
3. collaBoratIVe DeFeNce aGaINSt 
aScm attacK
The new breed of ASCMs with low signature, supersonic 
speed and maneuverability designed to be capable of delivering 
more precise effects against a wide spectrum of targets at 
sea and ashore have made the ASMD increasingly difficult. 
By taking advantage of GPS-aided precision guidance and 
navigation allied with improved ship-borne mission planning 
facilities brought the abilities to execute complex multiple 
waypoint flight profiles in confined littoral environments and 
pick out the intended target from clutter, countermeasures and 
other shipping contracts have added further complexities12. 
Therefore, to defeat improved ASCMs with complex attack 
scenarios must be multi-layered and network-centric rather 
platform-centric. The conceptual model for cruise missile 
defence is the combined use of early warning airborne system, 
fighters and in many instances, airborne surveillance radars 
to detect, track and engage both launch aircraft and cruise 
missiles13. The future development to upgraded ASMD with 
increased radar scan rates, improved fire control mechanism 
with fast processing, low flying target detection and 
maneuvering target tracking capability will increase ability of 
ASMD to engage of the ASCMs. The collaborative engagement 
of ships networked with other platforms and airborne sensors 
along with upgraded engagement capability of individual ships 
further increase interception probability of incoming missiles. 
With this capability, an interceptor with active seeker can 
engage an incoming missile that is not detected and controlled 
by the interceptor firing platform but has rather been informed 
by other platforms in the network14.
3.1 effect of Sensor Network
In case of multi-platform sensor network model, the 
detection probability pd in Eqn. (3) can be modified as
(1 (1 ) )Sd ip = − − δ                                                        (26)
where S is the number of sensors and δi the detection 
probability of the ith sensor. Effect of sensor networking 
increases the detection range rd [Eqn. (7)] by influencing the 
limitation of radar horizon and hence the radar detection range. 
The attacking missile can thus be engaged at the maximum 
effective range of the interceptor launched from the ASMD 
system under reference.
Firing sequence Pk= 0.5 Pk= 0.7 Pk= 0.8 Pk= 0.9
SS 2 2 2 2
S/S 1.50 1.30 1.20 1.10
SS/S 2.25 2.09 2.04 2.01
S/SS 2.00 1.60 1.40 1.20
SS/SS 2.50 2.18 2.08 2.02
S/S/S 1.75 1.39 1.24 1.11
SS/SS/SS 2.63 2.20 2.08 2.02
SS/S/SS 2.50 2.14 2.06 2.01
SS/SS/S 2.56 2.19 2.08 2.02
Firing 
policy-
SS: a salvo of 2 shoots
S/S: shoot-look-shoot 
S/S/S: shoot-look-shoot-look-shoot
SS/S: salvo(2)-look-shoot
SS/SS: salvo(2)-look-salvo(2)
Si/Sj/…(n).: salvo(i)-look-salvo(j)-look-…n sequence
table 2. expected number of interceptors required in salvo-
look-salvo firing
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3.2 effect of layered Defence
Assuming p’kl as the kill probability of the l
th layer of 
ASMD having L non-overlapping layers, the cumulative kill 
probability of the ASCM can be expressed as
( )
1
1 1
L
k kl
l
p p
=
′= − −∏                                                    (27)
The layered defence may be capable to engage not only 
any long range missile but also the missile launch platform.
4. coNcluSIoNS
This paper analyses the anti-ship missile defence system 
effectiveness by considering a scenario of a single ship defence 
with multiple interceptors firing against a single missile attack. 
Effect of different firing policies undertaken by the defender to 
achieve maximum ship survivability and expected number of 
interceptors to be fired to achieve desired outcome have been 
considered. The probabilities considered here are taken as 
constants; however, these probabilities can be evaluated using 
detailed models separately. The model can further be used for 
analysing impact of new technology, upgradation and tactics 
on the effectiveness of both anti-ship missile system and anti-
ship missile defence system after suitable modifications. The 
model can be extended by incorporating multiple missile 
engagements from single or multiple directions at same 
or different time sequences, maneuvering missile threats, 
multi-layered defence and multi-platform defence scenarios. 
However, these would make the model complex and therefore 
difficult to get analytical solutions for probability computations 
and in such cases, simulation may be preferable to determine 
the solution of the model.
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1. calculatIoN oF lauNcH INItIatIoN 
raNGe : rL1
Anti-ship missile defence (ASMD) requires time to react 
and launch the first interceptor after the initial detection. If the 
detection range, rd is greater than the maximum interceptor 
effective range, xre, then ASMD waits for some time to launch 
the intercept or so as to intercept the target at the range xre. 
In case of rd<xre, the interceptor will be launched as soon 
as ASMD detects the threat. Figure A1 below illustrates the 
sequence of events.
If ASMD initiates launching the first interceptor after the 
target detection and firing decision at time t=0, then after (τ+ 
tL) time the first interceptor is launched. During this time the 
ASCM covers a distance (τ+ tL)VASCM. If tf is the time taken by 
the interceptor to intercept the target at the maximum effective 
range xre, then we get, 
Appendix A
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And the range to launch the first interceptor is: 
( )1 intL f ASCM f Lr V t V t t= + + τ +                                 (A2)
Thus, we get
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Figure a1.  Sequence of events diagram for initial launch of the interceptor.
